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Performing Modularity: Competing Rules, Performative Struggles 
and the Mutual Constitution of Theory and Organization 
 
Abstract 
We address the effect of organizational theories on the organization by focusing on 
how modularity, a widespread and influential organizational theory, is able to enact a 
modular organization. While scholars have offered opposing arguments for the 
influence of this theory – i.e. that it either succeeds or fails to ‘produce’ modular 
organizations – we show just how and how far modularity is enacted and shapes the 
organization, and how it may be shaped in turn. Drawing on recent advances in 
performativity theory we thus contribute to modularity by showing how the modular 
organization emerges over time as the outcome of performative struggles among 
competing and complementary theories and how these struggles modify the theory 
and ‘design’ organizations. We also add to performativity by theorizing the 
competition between multiple theories, the emergence of unexpected consequences 
or ‘errors’, and their implications for organizational practices and boundaries.  
 
Keywords: Performativity, Modularity, Reliability, Organizational Change, 
Materiality, Ethnography 
 
Introduction 
Modularity is a core organizational and management theory which, in the past decade or so, has been 
adopted and implemented by an increasing number of manufacturing organizations in sectors varying 
from electronics to automotive. As a theory (Baldwin and Clark 2000), it has provided the tools to 
theorize the transition from Chandler’s vertically integrated multi-divisional firm (Chandler 1977) to 
the vertically specialised corporation characterised by a disintegrated and geographically dispersed 
value chain (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). At the organizational level, modularity has allowed firms 
to organize complex products and processes more efficiently (Baldwin and Clark 1997). According to 
its proponents, the decomposition of a complex system into discrete sub-systems with loose-coupling 
- and the associated decentralised coordination via standardised interfaces – has in fact helped firms 
streamline their products and operations, whilst benefiting from autonomous innovation and 
managing complexity (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996).   
 
Modularity therefore appears to do more than organize products: in some important respects, it also 
appears to produce organizations.  Precisely how, and to what extent this might be the case, however, 
has been a matter of contention. With regard to the influence of modularity over the organization, the 
scholarly debate has seen different positions take hold. Whilst some have emphasized the power of 
modularity rules to produce modular organizations (Simon 1962; Henderson and Clark 1990; Ulrich 
and Eppinger 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Baldwin and Clark 2000; Schilling 2000; Sturgeon 
2002; Langlois 2003), others have suggested that this relationship may be more complicated (Brusoni 
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et al. 2001; Chesbrough and Kusunoki 2001; Takeishi 2002; Chesbrough 2003; Hobday, Davies and 
Prencipe 2005; Brusoni and Prencipe 2006).  In this latter respect, authors have pointed to the 
discrepancy between product and organizational architectures and how this is due to contingent 
factors that ultimately impinge on the ability of modular design rules to bring about modular 
organizations. This insight has led scholars to argue for the need to look beyond abstract design rules 
to uncover the additional variables that regulate the fit between product and organisational 
architectures. Evolving organizational knowledge and skill bases (Brusoni et al. 2001; Chesbrough 
and Kusunoki 2001; Takeishi 2002; Brusoni and Prencipe 2006), for example, are seen to be amongst 
the key features that contribute to ‘designing’ organizations (Brusoni et al. 2001).  
 
Extant approaches to the study of modularity appear to be offering contrasting explanations about the 
influence of modularity over the organization. Modularity rules, thus, may wield a strong influence 
such that they produce highly modular, almost Lego-like, organizations (Sanchez and Mahoney 
1996), or they may instead have little or no effect, or even the opposite effect where they may bring 
about ‘non-modular’ or even ‘integral’ organizations (Brusoni and Prencipe 2006). In capturing some 
fundamental aspects of how modularity may succeed or fail to produce modular organizations, both 
schools of thought have implicitly suggested that modularity design rules can potentially have a wide 
range of effects. In focusing either on the power of modularity rules to produce modular organizations 
(mainstream approach), or their failure therein (contingency approach), however, extant contributions 
have left the spectrum of intermediate outcomes, modularity’s ‘performation space’, largely under-
theorized.  
 
Addressing this gap involves developing a more comprehensive account of the range of effects of 
modularity rules over the organization. This includes theorizing the micro-level mechanisms that may 
support or hinder the translation of modular products into modular organizations and how these 
mechanisms might shift dynamically, in context and over time. This analytic endeavour calls for new 
ways to conceive of and study modularity not as the direct outcome of design and outsourcing 
strategies, but as a process, that is an effortful, on-going, constantly challenged and negotiated 
accomplishment. In turn, it entails relinquishing interpretations of modularity as a solid and discrete 
feature of products and/or organizations, to study it as an emergent phenomenon, one which is deeply 
and inextricably entangled with the sociomaterial practices that perform it (Barad 2003; Langley and 
Tsoukas 2010). A micro-level, situated and dynamic perspective, we posit, would bear important 
implications for how we study modularity and the influence of organizational theories more generally.  
 
Studying modularity as an enacted and emergent property of products, technologies and organization 
is a relevant and timely endeavour which however requires new conceptual tools. Drawing on recent 
advances in Economic Sociology (Callon 1998) and the Sociology of Finance (MacKenzie 2006), and 
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related advances in Organizational Theory (Cabantous and Gond 2011), we advance a performative 
perspective on modularity. While building closely on extant mainstream (Baldwin and Clark 2000) 
and contingency-based approaches (Brusoni et al 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe 2006), this view 
captures the relationship between theory and organisation in its complexity. Our research questions 
are as follows: how and how far is modularity performed, in an actual organizational setting and over 
time? What is the influence of the organizational context in the performation of modularity rules? And 
what are the wider implications for theorizing the performativity of organizational theories, and the 
mutual shaping of organizational theories and the organization? We begin by introducing the notion 
of performativity.  
Conceptual background 
The performative effects of theories 
There is an increasing awareness of the links between organizational theories and their ‘performative’ 
effects. In recent years, performativity-inspired approaches drawing on Practice Theory (Suchman 
1987; Schatzki et al. 2001), Science and Technology Studies (Latour 1987; Pickering 1995; Callon 
1998; MacKenzie 2006) and contemporary Philosophy (Butler 1993; Mol 2005; Barad 2007) have 
been gaining increasing recognition in mainstream Organizational and Management Theory (Beunza 
and Stark 2004; Ferraro et al. 2005; Cabantous and Gond 2011).  
For instance, authors have described theories as constitutively shaping the design and performance of 
management practices and institutional arrangements, the social norms that regulate organizational 
and individual behaviour, and the language, categories and assumptions that actors use to interpret the 
world around them  (Ferraro et al. 2005). Further contributions have argued for the need to study 
organizations as sets of relations recurrently performed and reproduced over time and space 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2008). According to these authors, organizational boundaries should never be 
conceptualized as solid or static but as constantly emergent and enacted in recurrent activities 
(Feldman and Orlikowski 2011). A similar observation applies to organizational practices or routine: 
the routines’ ostensive - or abstract - pattern can never be taken for granted but needs to be ‘brought to 
life’ every time through situated performance and enactment (Pentland and Feldman 2008).  
In this paper we focus on a recent perspective on performativity which has emerged out of study of 
economic and financial markets as this, we believe, can provide a particularly useful template for 
conceptualising the influence of organisational theories. Authors in this stream of work have 
suggested that theories and models are not simple descriptions of a setting but powerful ‘engines’ 
which can profoundly transform the contexts they describe (MacKenzie, 2006). The key tenets of neo-
classical Economic Theory, for example, do not simply describe the economy but are actually being 
performed within markets (Callon 1998). Such is the strength of this performation that markets come 
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to resemble the theory. Similarly, the mathematical models that underpin financial derivatives 
(theory) do not simply rest outside the market (reality) but are a constituent part of it (MacKenzie 
2006, MacKenzie and Millo 2003). This, however, does not imply that theories are deterministically 
applied (MacKenzie  2009). Rather, they are enacted through iterative cycles of ‘framing’, where 
theories begin to shape reality, ‘overflowing’, whereby differences emerge between reality and the 
theory, and ‘reframing’, whereby there is again convergence between theory and reality (Callon, 
1998). These contributions thus provide the basis for a dynamic study of the effect of theories over 
markets or organizations.  
This dynamic approach, we suggest, is especially useful in highlighting how the influence of theories 
is never complete, and may vary significantly in degrees and levels. MacKenzie (2006), for example, 
has distinguished between theories that - when they are applied - have no or little observable effect on 
a setting (‘generic’ performativity), those that ‘make a difference’ in some way (‘effective 
performativity’), those that bring about the ‘state of affairs’ for which they are a good ‘empirical 
description’ (‘Barnesian performativity’), and, finally, those theories that change economic processes 
so they conform less well to their depiction by theories (‘counter-performativity’). Through 
foregrounding the dynamic adaptation between theory and reality, performativity can help us account 
for the nuanced and dynamic effects of modularity, and wider organizational theories, on the 
organization. 
Performativity: Key Notions 
In order to understand how Performativity can help us capture the co-production of modularity and 
the modular organization, we first need to look closer at its language and features. To this purpose we 
introduce four of its key constructs, starting from the notion of theory. Theories are understood 
broadly as including “[…] formulas, methods, tools and instruments as well as verbal formulations” 
(MacKenzie et al. 2007:15). In the context of this paper, for example, the dominant theory relates to 
the organization’s imperative to follow a “[…] strategy of modularity [which] entails both belief 
(“this is the best course open to us”) and commitment (“we are going to follow this course”) to 
modularity” (Carliss Baldwin, personal communication). A theory is considered ‘successful’ (Callon 
2007), or performative, when it brings about the vision of the world contained within.  
 
In order to become performative, a theory or statement has to create a sociomaterial ensemble, or 
agencement (Callon 1998), our second key notion. This must contain the theory and all the elements 
required to realize it (Callon 2007), including a heterogeneous collection of material features 
(including technology, texts, and bodies) that “participate in its design, elaboration, experimentation, 
change, maintenance, extension and operation” (Callon and Caliskan 2010: 23). Thus for a theory to 
be performative, it has to involve a heterogeneous configuration of people and materials that supports 
its assumptions.  
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A third key idea, one which is as yet underdeveloped in the literature, is that the effect of a theory can 
only be decided in relation to other theories. Multiple theories typically coexist at any one time within 
any organization. Some of these may be complementary, whilst others may compete and clash 
substantially or irremediably (Callon 2007). In order to theorize the influence of a theory in its context 
and over time, we thus need to take a further step and capture how it may operate ‘at large’, that is in 
conjunction with other organizational theories and their rules. So far, for example, little is known 
about “[…] how alternative [theories] compete within organizations […] through “performative 
struggles” (Cabantous and Gond 2011: 582) and “influence behaviours and outcomes” (Cabantous et 
al. 2014). In the case of modularity, this includes theorizing the process by which the modular 
organization emerges over time and the (organizational and contextual) sociomaterial dynamics that 
underpin its inner workings.  
 
The point about sociomateriality takes us to the final key tenet. In a context where multiple statements 
struggle to establish themselves, one at the expense of the other, the potential of a theory to gather 
strength and prevail is closely related to its ability to involve not only actors but also artifacts and 
material devices (i.e. texts, documents, technologies). For example, by embedding their objectives and 
views as ‘scripts’ (Akrich 1992) into stable, durable and visible artifacts such as software, flowcharts 
or computer systems, actors might be able to reinforce their own views and objectives over those of 
agencies, i.e. organizational communities, functions or teams, that are not so well equipped (Callon 
and Muniesa 2005). Performativity therefore provides opportunities to theorize the sociomaterial 
mechanisms that underpin the co-evolution of organizational theories and the organization.  
Methods 
Research context 
To capture the influence of modularity theory over the organization we draw from the in-depth, 
longitudinal study of a pioneering electronics manufacturing firm – an early producer of workstations, 
storage and high-end computer servers - whose history has been interwoven with the history of 
modularity in important ways. As part of our investigation, we were able to establish the presence of 
close historical links between this company and modularity theory from the early years when this 
company was a fast-rising high-technology start up.  Sources report how the pioneering methods used 
by this organisation to manage its design and production activities had generated an early interest in 
management scholars towards understanding the laws that underpinned modularity and its principles, 
therefore directly inspiring the ground-breaking Harvard research on modularity (Russell 2012). From 
the beginning, in the early 1980s, the company pursued modularity as an efficiency-seeking strategy 
aimed at streamlining and standardizing products and operations. The firm’s progressive vision of 
modularity, which supported at the same time superior performance and cost efficiencies, by mixing 
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and matching standardized third-party components, allowed it to “solv[e] a critical paradox of 
computing” (Baldwin and Clark 2000). This “open systems strategy” (company archives) in turn gave 
the company outstanding advantage over those competitors which were following more conventional 
‘closed’ trajectories (West 2003). 
 
A relentless faith in modularity distinguished the company from its competitors from the outset. 
Everything in their system was modular, “[…] from the lowest level circuits within microprocessors 
to the highest level system software and application programmes. Its products could be connected 
easily to one another and other systems, like so many digital tinker toys” (company press archive). 
The company’s flamboyant CEO was himself a strong advocate of modularity. In his public speeches 
he often drew from the Lego metaphor, the shorthand for modularity, by comparing their products to 
“[…] a car built out of Lego blocks that [will] all fit together very nicely, and if you don’t like [our 
component], take that Lego block out and put [a competitor’s module] in it” (ibid). From the early 
1980s, therefore, and throughout the company’s phenomenal hike up the electronics industry ranks for 
the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s, the company’s belief in the power of modularity appeared 
unshakable.  
 
The emphasis on modularity remained strong even when, during the mid-nineties, the company 
switched from building only workstations – aimed at the expert engineering user who could 
independently resolve any reliability issues that might have arisen - to high-end enterprise servers - 
aimed at the less competent corporate end user. The acquisition of a new server product line, 
purchased through a multi-million dollar deal that had made the history of computing, had in fact 
highlighted potential tensions between modularity and the further rationale of ‘reliability’. Reliability 
appeared to gain relevance in a server context, where computers are used to run mission-critical 
activities in organizations (such as hospitals, banks and ISPs) which cannot afford any significant 
server downtime. Reliability thus threatened to challenge modularity’s so far uncontested dominance 
in the company strategy, vision and value set. 
 
Even the acquisition of the new server product line (including the very same server which is the focus 
of this study), and the new reliability ethos supported by the various management and computer 
experts that had come across with it, however, did not dampen the company’s enthusiasm towards 
modularity. Modularity made mixing and matching components appear a straightforward activity 
which was unlikely to bear any repercussions on the performance of other components or on the 
system as a whole (Fleming and Sorenson 2001). Modularity and reliability were thus not considered 
incompatible as, in a modular product, any errors and defects detected during testing could be, at least 
in theory, ‘swapped out’ of the system simply by replacing any failed standardised modular 
components with new ones (Baldwin and Clark 2000). According to our practitioners this principle 
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applied to workstations as much as servers, the latter simply requiring more extensive testing 
compared to the former, in order to detect and swap any potentially defective components.  
 
Modularity and reliability thus appeared initially to be happily coexisting side by side. The company’s 
CEO illustrated the supposedly harmonious relationship between reliability and modularity in 
computers in a speech when he stated: “Imagine if I had an airplane hangar at home, I designed my 
own plane from different parts, and I told you to fly it. It wouldn’t be safe, yet that’s what we’re 
doing” (press archives). Encouraged by this high-level rhetoric which acknowledged reliability while 
at the same time relegating it to the background, the company basked in the certainty that modularity 
would continue to reign unchallenged. And reign it did, at least for another few years. 
 
Between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century the electronics sector bubble 
finally burst. We were already working on site when the company begun to realize that profit margins 
were significantly shrinking. The effect of the crisis was to create a strong drive towards further 
efficiency/cost cutting which was to be achieved through modularity and further standardisation. The 
CEO, at this point, predicted “[…] a ‘massive standardization’ in the way technology is deployed and 
developed” (press archive). This move was supported by an even greater emphasis on modularity, not 
only at the product but also at the organizational level which provided greater flexibility to switch 
suppliers to acquire the latest innovations and best practice. This also allowed increasingly delegating 
production and testing activities for (both non-core and core but non-critical) components to external 
manufacturers thus relinquishing responsibility for component-level faults and avoiding the costs of 
repair. It is therefore during this period that the company’s belief in the power of modularity begun to 
take hold even further. Modularity, and the associated quest for superior efficiencies, was going to 
lead them out of the crisis.  
 
In the spectrum spanning from integrality to modularity, they therefore set out to place themselves at 
the far modularity end by adopting a totally disintegrated organizational structure (something which 
however they never fully realized, as we discuss later). They intended to achieve this by becoming the 
‘perfectly modular’ organisation. This involved focusing on one or few core modules and activities 
and co-ordinating the rest through arm’s length transactions (Campagnolo and Camuffo 2009: 273). 
The principle behind this involved buying rather than making: they would no longer need to be 
manufacturers but would become perfect integrators (Hobday et al. 2005) focusing their capabilities 
on assembling computers out of third party components. It was precisely at this time that the Rework 
and Repair process for one of their server system’s core components, the computer board that is the 
focus of this study, was outsourced to its external manufacturer.  
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The drive towards standardisation/efficiency thus seemed inexorable. Further down at the 
organizational level, this involved an increased push towards “standardised work procedures (across 
departments and business units) and documented steps, the presence of electronic databases, and 
procedures and systems for transferring knowledge across projects and business units” (Campagnolo 
and Camuffo 2009: 276). As part of this, the company started looking for additional efficiency-
bearing strategies which would allow to lower production costs while further streamlining their 
processes. The ‘zero inventory’ philosophy, for example, which includes the Autoswap system which 
we discuss later, involved introducing new IT-based lean tools that would allow them to substantially 
reduce inventory overheads. It was not yet evident at this stage that the increasing emphasis on 
efficiency, supported by product and organizational modularity and complementary inventory rules, 
could conflict with reliability with important consequences for the organization.   
 
In the sections that follow we analyse the rise and fall of modularity within and beyond the boundaries 
of this outstanding organization. In so doing, we focus on the performation of modularity and 
complementary efficiency-bearing rules and their confrontation with the competing rules 
underpinning the philosophy of reliability. Through an in depth case study focusing on the changes 
that occurred in context and over time to the board Rework and Repair Process we theorize how and 
how far modularity was able to prevail over reliability and produce a modular organisation. 
Data collection and analysis 
Exploring the contrasting forces that drive towards - or away from - the modularisation of product and 
organization requires the close observation of organizational processes to identify changes occurring 
to product, technology and organizational interfaces. To this purpose we draw inspiration from the 
notions of an ‘artifact’s biography’ (Appadurai 1986) which consists in following key stages of an 
artefact’s life-cycle to uncover its changes in context and over time. Following the biographical 
approach, first, we mapped the changes occurring to a key process, the computer board ‘Rework and 
Repair’ routine over time as it was outsourced and later on re-insourced; and, second, we followed the 
board’s rework cycle at different stages to see how this changed as a consequence of the rework being 
conducted in-house or at the supplier’s premises. This entailed ‘following the board around’ over time 
and as it crossed the boundaries between supplier and integrator in a typical repair cycle.  The 
biographical approach provided us with insights into Modularity and its innermost workings, 
including how it may affect the emergence of organizational boundaries. 
Participant-observation 
Our evidence, based on the detailed observation of production and testing operations at an electronics 
manufacturer, was gathered during a wider three-year ethnographic study during which one of the 
authors was a resident researcher. Direct, daily observation revealed the micro-level, situated 
organizational dynamics by which Modularity was performed, thus providing the basis for a rich 
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‘ethnography of modularity’. Throughout that period, the researcher enjoyed privileged resident 
status, involving open access to people and facilities for the purpose of observation and interviews. 
This included access to meetings, including those involving suppliers (face-to-face, telephone- and 
video-conferences and online). The quality and extent of access allowed us to capture in detail the 
‘Repair and Rework’ routine (Orr 1990; Pentland 1992) as it unravelled in space and time (Balogun 
and Johnson 2004).  
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews were conducted at the manufacturer’s premises with practitioners operating at different 
organizational levels, sites and functions. Additional interviews were conducted with supplier 
representatives whilst on visit at the integrator’s premises, as well as with resident suppliers 
‘permanently’ situated in a dedicated and clearly demarcated section of the shop floor. Due to the 
idiosyncratic, situated and highly technical nature of interviews, there was no unified, standard 
protocol. Interviews were instead tailored to specific issues, project stages, portions of the process, 
and individual respondents (taking into account their organizational rank and expertise).  
Company databases and archives  
Additional longitudinal data relating to periods preceding our direct involvement on site was gathered 
by accessing the company’s internal archives. Crucially, our researcher was also assigned a place 
within the organizational hierarchy (seven handshakes from the CEO) which came with a corporate 
digital ID card and email account. These allowed ‘anywhere and anytime’ remote access to company 
data and archives, including the opportunity to subscribe to internal alias lists. This proved 
instrumental for capturing both internal and external exchanges (i.e. across functions, teams and the 
integrator/supplier boundary). The data obtained through direct observation and participation in 
company’s activities was integrated with in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted across most 
organizational functions and levels.  
Data Analysis 
The data analysis and coding was undertaken jointly by both authors. The first author, acting as the 
‘insider’, was able to draw upon the substantial knowledge and expertise acquired through their 
prolonged engagement with the research site to formulate possible explanations. The second author, 
acting as the ‘outsider’, played as the devil’s advocate (Rerup and Feldman 2011) in challenging those 
emerging explanations. The second author also contributed towards analysing the data by proposing 
explanations that were either accepted or refuted by the first author, based on their intimate 
knowledge of the field (ibid). 
 
Alongside this dialectical role play we proceeded to analyse the data consistently with an inductive, 
‘grounded theorising’ approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967). This involved proceeding in an iterative 
manner, scanning the extensive field data for recurrent concepts and themes, consolidating these into 
emergent categories (Nag et al. 2007), and subsequently evolving categories through constant 
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comparison with related notions in the extant theory. This process led to developing new concepts, 
themes and dimensions, which captured how Modularity was performed over time and within the 
context of the rework process.  
 
Through applying the techniques of content analysis (Krippendorff 2003) and constant comparison 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) we were able to identify a number of emerging first-order codes (Van 
Maanen 1979).  Initially, notions surfacing from the observation of the Rework process and interview 
transcripts revolved around concepts such as “swapping”, “modular products”, “interchangeable 
components”, “a flexible organization”, “mix and match”, “open interfaces”, “delegating 
responsibility” and “the organization as a Lego system”. At a later stage, alternative notions begun to 
take hold. These revolved around concepts such as “fixing”, “fault-finding”, “a reliable product”, “an 
error-free organization”, “debugging”, “errors”, “quality as a top priority”, “we must never fail”, 
“owning the problem”, and “failure-is-not-an-option”. Further axial comparison (Strauss and Corbin 
1990) between and among the codes revealed that these converged around two main patterns, which, 
using the informants’ labels (Van Maanen 1979) we coded as “swapping” and “fixing”. 
 
The juxtaposition of these emergent categories with those in the relevant literature produced a crucial 
discovery: each set of concepts (“swapping” or “fixing”) was largely consistent with the rules and 
assumptions typical of a specific organizational theory, Modularity or Reliability, as it may be played 
out in an actual organizational context. Put in other words, our sets of first-order concepts pointed to 
the fact that the principles of Modularity and Reliability Theory were distinctly at work within the 
Rework process, as highlighted by the fact that their rules and their effects were being constantly 
invoked during the course of everyday actions and discourses. This creative - but firmly grounded - 
leap (Suddaby 2006) allowed us to “lift” our first-order codes to a more abstract level and led to 
coding (modularity and reliability) rules and errors as second-order themes. In addition, field quotes 
also showed how rules were supported (embodied, embedded and enacted) by heterogeneous 
ensembles of artifacts and communities which appeared to exert a key influence over the rework 
process and its outcomes. This led us to code artifacts and communities as further second-order codes.  
 
Constant immersion in the data (Langley 1999) combined with comparison against the extant 
literature allowed us to take our analysis to a further level of abstraction. As the evidence clearly 
indicated, Modularity and Reliability rules were not simply nominally present, but were being enacted 
and were shaping the Rework process. This, in turn, suggested that Modularity and Reliability Theory 
and their assumptions were having an effect on the process. The second creative leap in our analysis 
thus involved the realization that capturing the patterns emerging from the field required a framework 
able to explain the effect of organizational theories over organizational processes. Our search for a 
‘theory of theories’ or a ‘meta-theory’ led us to engage with Performativity Theory’s emergent 
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constructs. This insight led us to characterize the effect of the rules and errors over the Rework 
process in terms of “framing” and “overflowing” (Callon 1998) and the influence of theories on the 
Rework process as “performing” (our overarching dimension). This process led to developing a new 
framework which captures how Modularity was performed over time within the context of the 
Rework process. 
 
Finally, further examination of interview and observation data confirmed that the balance of power 
between the two theories was unstable. This was highlighted by the fact that terms pointing to 
“fixing” or “swapping” were alternatively gaining and losing emphasis over time. Following these 
key insights, we were able to identify three stages which captured the co-performation of Modularity 
and Reliability over time and within the board the repair cycle: Stage 1- swapping prevailed almost 
unquestioned and fixing was in the background; Stage 2- swapping and fixing were opposing each 
other in every aspect and at every level of the Rework cycle; and Stage 3- swapping prevailed again 
but modified.   
  
While drawing on a single case, our findings afford further generalizable findings about the complex 
relationship between, in this case, modularity theory and the modular organization, and, more in 
general, organizational theories and the organization. Powerful generalisations (Siggelkow 2007; 
Feldman and Orlikowski 2011) can in fact result from combining strong inductive theorizing with a 
practice perspective (Schatzki et al. 2001) based on Performativity Theory (Callon 1998, MacKenzie 
2006), which entails embracing the complexity and ambiguity of organizational life and emphasising 
its multiplicity and emergence. A deeply grounded inductive approach drawing on in depth and 
longitudinal case study evidence can therefore provide fertile terrain for theory development.  
 
Performing modularity in the board repair cycle 
 
The biography of a computer board 
To capture the influence of modularity and its rules we draw from the detailed study of the computer 
board ‘Rework and Repair’ cycle. A computer printed circuit board is a flat insulating sheet to which 
integrated circuits and other components are attached and is a critical component of the overall 
computer server system (Soanes and Stevenson 2005). Servers are complex, customized, high-
performance, -quality and -reliability machines that provide essential services across a network of 
computers. For example they can be used to host databases, files and web email. They are individually 
configured to contain several printed circuit boards, based on their performance and customer 
specification. Our server can contain up to thirty-six boards, which can perform together or as thirty-
six individual computers.  
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There are several reasons why a board might fail: it can contain fabrication defects, it can become 
damaged during transportation, or it can be accidentally broken through manual or robot handling in 
the factory. Whatever the source of failure, this has to be identified and corrected. Repair must be 
followed by thorough tests to verify that the fault has been fixed. Undetected board level faults are in 
fact likely to generate system failures that can occur at any stages of the product life-cycle.  
 
While being a crucial aspect of high-end server production, the fault-finding and bug-fixing process 
appears at first sight to be rather simple and repetitive. The reality, however, could not be more 
different. The repair process is situated at the front line of the emergence and persistence of the 
modular organization, reflecting some of the key tensions that contribute to make an organization 
truly, or at least partially, modular. This is because it is precisely in this kind of context that 
organizational boundaries are typically re-negotiated. In the following sections, we set out to follow 
the computer board around the Rework and Repair process, as it unravels across the boundaries 
between systems integrator and component supplier.  
Stage 1- Modularity ‘rules’  
In the early days following the acquisition of the server division from an outstanding competitor, 
whose fate was declining, board Rework and Repair activities were conducted in-house, in a 
dedicated portion of the shop floor known as the ‘Failure Analysis’ (FA) area. Here, specialist tools 
and training were made available to technicians to ensure that repairs were conducted in a focused and 
timely manner. This all changed following the onset of the electronics meltdown. Fully embracing a 
modular production strategy led our firm to focus on systems design and integration, while mostly 
delegating the production of specialist product components (including computer boards) to their 
external manufacturers. This provided the organization with the increased flexibility to switch 
suppliers, as well as increasing or decreasing production following the fluctuations in demand that are 
typical of this sector (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Sturgeon 2002), especially at a time of crisis. 
 
There was another consequence to the modularisation of production and production-related 
knowledge, one that is mostly unacknowledged in the extant literature which locates product testing 
activities entirely within the boundaries of the systems integrator organization (ibid). Following the 
outsourcing of board production, key problem-solving routines such as fault-finding and failure 
recovery, which had been until then conducted in-house, had become distributed across the 
integrator/supplier boundary. This generated some important implications which we identify by 
examining the computer board’s Rework and Repair cycle at the time of fieldwork (Figure 1). 
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
A computer board is produced at the supplier’s facility where it undergoes basic testing. It is then 
shipped to the systems integrator where it is put through further advanced testing trials. When a fault 
is found and a board needs to be repaired (or reworked, in technical jargon) it is sent back to the 
supplier which then issues a new board and sends it to the integrator in exchange for the defective 
one. The supplier repairs the defective board and sends it out again to the integrator as a new board, as 
further requests for materials come through. Once it arrives at the integrator, the repaired board is 
once again scanned and put through the testing process. This process, as observed at the time of 
fieldwork, appeared to be in all respects very efficient and straightforward. This was until the day in 
which a rather low key and seemingly harmless email was circulated around the organization. 
“No closed loop on the Failure Root Cause” 
The email below came from a Senior Manager from another production site, who was about to join 
the facility to lead the product engineering aspects of a large transition project.  
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 16:58:31 -0700 (PDT) 
From: Lead Product Engineer Lead.Engineer@ComputerCo.com 
Subject: Re: Localised Rework 
To: TransferTeamAlias@ComputerCo.com 
 
I would like to discuss doing in-house rework on [server family name] products in [your manufacturing 
location]. […] 
 
 [Right now, at your site] there [seems to be] no closed loop on the Failure Root Cause to update the 
tech’s understanding of the failures. […] 
 
I am actually going to forward some of this discussion to the FINAO managers’ alias. I think this will be 
a topic at the project review next Monday. 
Lead Product Engineer 
The email was written in response to an earlier message by the site’s Principal Supplier Engineer, 
which included data about localised rework on the servers’ board assemblies at the site. The Lead 
Engineer’s email was addressed to the Transfer Project Operations Team and subsequently forwarded 
to the “Failure Is Not An Option” (FINAO) Management alias list. The FINAO team, at the time, was 
involved in key decisions regarding which aspects of server production had to be harmonised across 
the different production sites. As the name indicates, the team had a mandate to ensure that the 
production process and its key outputs (computer servers) were reliably similar across sites. Such 
coordination was required to ensure that products coming out of different factories around the world 
would meet the same cost, performance, quality, lead-time and reliability specifications. This, in turn, 
involved selecting which processes, tools, materials and organisations had to be aligned across 
locations and which could be allowed to differ. The Repair and Rework process was one of those key 
areas that, at the time, were under scrutiny.  
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The FINAO Team, perhaps unsurprisingly given its mandate, responded promptly to this call which 
was highlighting a potential loss of reliability in the Rework area. The FINAO alias list included one 
of the authors, who at the time was a resident researcher monitoring the transfer project. In response 
to the email, the Team began to pull rework/failure data out of the Quality function. Data appeared to 
suggest that there was “[…] a [statistically significant] population of boards that keeps coming back 
from the vendor and does not get repaired” (Quality Director’s email).  
 
At the same time, the Lead Engineer began to gather data from his production site to support his 
hypothesis. Data here showed that “[…] the production line in [his manufacturing site] is moving 
toward in-house rework, rather than away from it” (Lead Engineer’s email). At the FINAO meeting, 
the following Monday, it was agreed that there was sufficient evidence of potential reliability losses to 
assign a budget and a task team and begin an investigation aimed at uncovering and rectifying the 
potential reliability issues. Our researcher decided at that point that the topic was sufficiently relevant 
to the purpose of his/her study to dedicate part of her time to monitor closely the efforts of the 
investigation team. In a short time frame, thus, an entirely new network had been mobilised. This 
network was built around the notion of reliability and would soon present a serious challenge to 
modularity rules and their network.  
Stage 2 - The investigation: Reliability gains strength 
The investigation analysed the Rework Process in the greatest detail and produced a report 
summarising the outcomes. Findings confirmed that, within the Rework cycle, there were instances 
where the integrity of information and data flows broke down. This borne significant implications for 
problem-solving and learning processes, as it created opportunities for faults within the boards to 
escape detection. In the following section we consider in detail the main issues at play in the Rework 
Cycle at the time of fieldwork, as exposed by the investigation.  
The board’s loss of history and identity 
One of the investigation’s key findings highlighted an issue with how the boards’ identities were 
managed. When a board undergoing testing at the integrator was found to be faulty, it was taken out 
of the production sequence and sent back to the supplier for repair. There it was repaired, re-serialised 
and eventually sent back to the integrator as a fresh new board. The term ‘fresh’ indicated that the 
board was considered ‘as new’, as it had never been faulty. The rationale behind the re-serialization 
was the systems integrator’s need to avoid the overheads involved in retaining a board’s history. This 
was supported by the Materials function: “If […] we find that the material [is] defective, then the 
expectation would be that we return that material to the supplier” (Head of Materials).  
 
This logic, however, was not without implications. The board’s new identity, its new serial number, 
would later prevent recalling its failure history, including all the data pertaining to failures and 
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subsequent repairs. The re-serialisation also meant that, in absence of failure history, the integrator 
would be unable to learn from its own mistakes or the supplier’s. By re-serializing and treating the 
modules as fully interchangeable despite previous failures, the integrator was favouring “swapping” 
over “fixing”. This, in turn, generated an error of the fixing kind: the loss of failure and repair history. 
“Zero Inventory” system and “Autoswap” 
Another key aspect of the investigation concerned the Autoswap process, a formal procedure 
associated with the efficiency-bearing principles of lean inventory systems, “Lean Production” and 
“Just-In-Time”. These established management practices are known means of reducing the costs and 
risks associated with holding large stocks of inventory (Adler et al. 1999), costs which can be 
extremely high in the electronics sector. To reduce its costs, our integrator strived to hold the lowest 
possible stocks of inventory (a device also known as “zero inventory”). 
 
Following this philosophy, our organization had set up a streamlined Inventory Control System 
managed through Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software and the Oracle database. The 
software-embedded planning system required that every time a faulty board was returned to the 
vendor for repair, this would immediately issue a new board and ship it to the integrator. This process 
was known as ‘Autoswap’: through the automatic swap of a faulty board for a new one, the levels of 
inventory at the integrator remained always constant. This eliminated the need for counting boards, 
and therefore greatly reduced inventory carrying costs: 
Autoswap is an Inventory Management System: I give you a board, you give me a board, I still have 
the same number of boards in my inventory. And you don’t have to say ‘I am giving you a board back, 
now I have to decrement my inventory’ until it gets back to me and then I put it back again […] 
Autoswap saves a lot of internal transactions, it is like balancing your cheque book: do I have to trace 
every penny that went in so that it gets back to me or do I just say in the end I have got the right 
amount of dollars (Product Engineer).  
Their quest for efficiency and leanness was also reflected in the configuration of the software system 
itself. While some aspects of inventory control such as Master Scheduling (planning for the 
acquisition of production materials) were supported through the purchase of dedicated ERP software 
modules, others, including Cycle Counting (techniques for organizing physical counting), were not.  
[…] you’ll find that, depending on which department you are in you may be lucky and have a modern 
ERP module or you can be frustrated because your particular field of interest is not really seen as the 
core work. And the core work on the ERP side of things is in terms of MRP, Materials Planning, 
Master Scheduling, etc. […] not the inventory (Inventory Controller). 
Our Inventory Controller, whose mandate involved preserving inventory accuracy and integrity, did 
not share the lean ‘zero inventory’ philosophy embedded in the inventory system (reducing counting 
overheads). He argued instead for a more sophisticated system that would allow tracking and counting 
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materials. Counting, however, was entirely against the automatic swapping system’s lean philosophy 
and thus was not supported. While therefore greater quality control could have been achieved by 
acquiring further software capability enabling the counting, these resources were not made available.  
Resources were instead clearly aligned with the “Autoswap” methodology, as reflected in the choice 
of software modules, and clearly favoured “swapping” (not counting boards) over “fixing” (keeping 
track of failed boards). This indicated that the “swapping” imperative, this time combined with a “lean 
production” efficiency-bearing rationale, was prevailing within the Inventory aspect of the Rework. 
An emphasis on “swapping”, the automatic exchange of boards with the vendor, in turn implied a 
fixing type of error: not counting meant that they were not tracking boards, again leading to the loss of 
repair history. The organization as a result was extremely lean and run very efficiently, but potentially 
at the expense of quality and reliability.  
Ownership and responsibility   
A further issue found by the investigation was the integrator’s inability – and, most importantly, 
unwillingness - to track boards that it did not ‘own’. When our integrator returned a board to the 
supplier, it fully relinquished ownership of the component, thus entirely avoiding taking responsibility 
for its repair, and being held accountable for the damage. This, however, implied a loss of access to 
crucial repair-related information which remained with the supplier. Combined with the absence of 
any links between the systems integrator and the supplier’s databases, this meant that it was 
impossible for the integrator to keep track of what happened to a board once it left its premises.  
 
As practitioners set out to explore possible ways to solve this problem, they faced a number of 
obstacles. It was clear that the problem could not have been fixed, for example, by simply improving 
information sharing across the supplier/producer boundary. Both supplier and integrator were in fact 
against the prospect of sharing any confidential and proprietary data as they saw each other as 
potential direct competitors. Another possibility would have been to invest in component-tagging 
technology (radio frequency identification or RFID), for which the integrator is a world-leading 
producer. This strategy, however, would have gone entirely against the “swapping” philosophy, which 
was about not having to count and track boards. The rationale was that the savings procured by RFID 
would have been offset by even greater inventory and infrastructure costs.  
 
There was yet another reason, however, behind the integrator’s reluctance to own damaged boards. 
Tracking and tracing would have forced our firm to take responsibility for damaged boards, thus 
removing one of the main potential benefits of modularity and outsourcing. Tagging would have 
caused the integrator to incur the costs for repairing all the boards that it damaged, rather than simply 
being able to return them to the supplier: “[…] with Autoswap we don’t have to track by serial 
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number, where did it go, and if a board gets scratched or damaged [here] the vendor buys that board 
and we don’t ever have to see it again” (Product Engineer).  
 
Once again, they were “swapping”, while relegating “fixing” to the back stage. Swapping allowed the 
integrator greater flexibility in switching both components and their suppliers. This was based on 
establishing an arm’s length relationship with suppliers, supported by a clear division of ownership 
and responsibility. Advanced IT-based technologies such as RFID, which could have supported 
component traceability, were thus not invoked as they were against the main “swapping” philosophy. 
A fixing-type error was generated also in this case: their emphasis on “shifting” the problem to the 
supplier instead of “fixing”, combined with their unwillingness to track what happened afterwards, 
meant that they also lost access to crucial repair-related information. The contradiction was that, 
whereas their intention was to “lose” the failed board, they were instead very likely to see it again, 
only in the different, unrecognisable guise of a fresh, re-serialised board. 
Asymmetries: system vs. component view 
Another key finding of the investigation concerned the way competences were divided across the 
supplier/integrator boundary. The combination of modular and outsourcing strategies in fact implied a 
clean cut division of labour and competences. This generated strong knowledge, views and 
capabilities asymmetries between producer and supplier (Simon 1996; Marengo et al. 2005; Brusoni 
et al. 2001). These were clearly apparent in the area of testing.  
 
While in fact the integrator held both component and system testing capabilities, the supplier was only 
proficient at basic component testing. The supplier was therefore often unable to detect - and thus 
repair – any faults caused by the systemic interactions between the board and other components. 
According to a Product Engineer, “[...] Because of the way we designed our test process, the external 
manufacturer is not able to catch performance problems […]. We didn’t give them the extensive kinds 
of testing and the expensive equipment in order to do the functional level testing […]. That is actually 
left here”. At the system integrator, 
We run ‘exercisers’ kind of tests. So we put a board into a system and we run tests on that. We also 
run […], diagnostic […] and memory tests of different sorts. The requirement for most of those tests 
is that you actually have a running system, you have enough hardware around there to really start up 
a system under Unix and, […] in order to do that, you need a ‘hot mark-up’. So you need a test bed 
that has all the different pieces of the system in order to put the board in and make it run. (ibid) 
 
This indicated that the level of system testing capability at the supplier was low, an asymmetry that 
could have been tackled by sharing the system testing capabilities with the external manufacturers: 
“[Suppliers] are moving into more and more testing but […] to do the kind of functional level testing 
that we do you have to know a lot about the system: how was designed, what the architecture is, and 
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all the intricacies and details behind it” (Lead Product Engineer).The systems integration testing, 
instead, is a core capability for the integrator: 
So it’s a kind of strategic advantage, strategic capability that we have […] these high end systems, 
this is our bread and butter, this is where our technical strength is, so we want to make sure that they 
are tested well, everything works and all that […]. Assembly is not where the value added is for us: 
it’s the integration of the system. So [it’s about] the system level testing, and the testing of the sub 
parts and making that into a working system and making sure that all those things do work together, 
that you find as many problems as you can. [Besides,] we designed it and it is one of our 
competences right now [ibid, emphasis in the original].  
 
Establishing a clear separation between system and component testing, one of the main consequences 
of adopting a modular strategy meant that integrator and supplier had very different views of 
debugging and failure: one a system-based view, and the other a component-based view. The 
asymmetry in their views and cognitive frames (March and Simon 1958; Boland and Tenkasi 1995; 
Weick 1979), knowledge and capabilities (Simon 1996; Marengo et al. 2005), and access to tools and 
technologies (Callon and Caliskan 2010) was reflected in a strong bias in the way they were able to 
interpret and resolve hardware-related failures. The supplier, having no system testing tools, was 
unable to judge whether a board was faulty as they had no means to test the component within the 
system. The integrator, by contrast, was able to detect system failures and establish whether and how 
a board was defective. Again, by not giving the suppliers system testing capabilities they were 
favouring “swapping”, a clear division of knowledge across the supplier/integrator boundary, over 
“fixing” and they obtained a fixing kind of error: suppliers were unable to detect systemic failures. 
Testing procedures, rules and heuristic 
The investigation also found that both formal rules/procedures and informal heuristics were 
consistently supporting “swapping” over “fixing”. This became apparent when observing everyday 
practices on the shop floor. With regard to standard procedures, as one would expect from an 
organization fully committed to a modular strategy, technicians were taught to “swap” (switch and 
return a failed board to the supplier) rather than attempting to fix. Responsibility for component 
failure lain entirely with the supplier and this was reflected in the shop floor technicians’ low skill 
profile. Test techs were instructed not to attempt to fix a board as this would only risk damaging it 
further, thus shifting the responsibility/cost of repair to the integrator. 
 
Even when choosing to bypass formal procedures in favour of informal practices, however, our 
technicians were still “swapping”, not “fixing”. Technicians, for example, frequently worked around 
formal procedures by referring to known local trial and error heuristics based on their tacit knowledge 
(Narduzzo et al. 2000). An experienced technician presented with a failure would in fact often have a 
feel for which component had a higher likelihood to be the cause. This for example could be a hunch 
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based on knowledge of the component that most frequently failed. At other times, the server’s correct 
functioning could be assessed by touching the machine to judge its temperature or listening closely to 
ensure that its hum was consistent with “the sound of a well-tuned machine” (shop floor technician). 
Once identified the component suspected of causing the failure, the technician would proceed to 
extract and reject the presumed faulty component without making any further enquiries, and then 
swap the failed component for a new one. The sequence would be completed by re-testing the system 
to confirm that the cause of the problem had actually been eliminated.  
 
While effective, however, this heuristic did not allow the test tech to establish the actual cause of 
failure. According to an Engineer, Failure Analysts (FA) “…do not have a definitive diagnosis of a 
failing board and they make an educated guess [as to] where the problem lies” (Lead Engineer, 
emphasis added). It follows that the FA cannot be sure whether the diagnosis is correct: “The 
feedback on whether [the solution] fixes the problem is not very good at this point” (ibid).  
This had never been an issue in the past whence failed boards were moved to the nearby FA area 
where they were diagnosed and fixed, and eventually scanned back into the production line. As a 
consequence of outsourcing repair to the supplier, however, the opportunity to pinpoint the exact 
cause of failure had been lost. The board was returned to the supplier with only “[…] an indication as 
to where the problem lies” (Lead Engineer), thus shifting the responsibility for finding the fault to the 
supplier. As the vendor did not have system test capabilities, however, they were often unable to find 
the fault.  
With Autoswap, the [faulty] board goes to the vendor, there is not repaired (the vendor does not have the 
system level test capability that we have in the factory) and then the board is returned [to us] in 
production in the flow of new boards, and often shows up as ‘New-To-Fail’ (ibid).  
As the integrator did not know that the board had previously failed and subsequently undergone 
repair, “The board [did] not go back to FA for failure validation before being inserted into the 
production process (ibid, emphasis added). The consequence was that: “Boards could end up in a loop 
with the FA for difficult-to-diagnose boards because the tech could repeatedly choose the same 
component for replacement because it has the highest probability of failure”. Learning both at the 
level of the individual expert and the organization was severely hindered as failure data could not be 
used to inform the tech’s future interactions with that particular board. Once again, practitioners 
favoured “swapping” (switching and shifting fault-finding to the supplier) and the result was a fixing 
kind of error: uncertainty about the actual cause of failure. 
Interfaces, systemic interactions and performance 
The last key finding of the investigation raised questions about the role of complexity and uncertainty 
in debugging complex, fully modular server products. Practitioners at the integrator, as explained 
earlier, were aware of the Modularity principles and the organization itself could be described as 
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striving towards full modularity as a goal. Their ambition was a Lego-like situation where they would 
be able to straightforwardly switch and return components to the supplier (“swapping”) without 
having to fix. As a result of their faith in Modularity, our practitioners believed that the clear 
decoupling of modules within a system should have eliminated the need for system level testing.  
 
Despite the fact that our organization presented a highly codified and standardized environment, 
however, decision-making process in hardware debugging confronted high levels of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. In high-end electronics, the fast pace of innovation combined with frequent imbalances 
between innovation at the component and system level (Brusoni et al. 2001) meant that problem 
solving processes such as bug fixing were often only imperfectly decoupled (Marengo et al. 2005). A 
particularly reflective practitioner raised this issue by voicing the opinion that, in high-end electronics, 
full modularity was more of an ideal that firms aspired to: 
[…] there is another issue right now, between having fully tested sub-components that you can ‘mix 
and match’ and put together vs. do we need to test something as a matching set. There is something 
with the way boards interact that we have to test them, you know, actually set up the material together 
to make sure that it works together and then not change anything. […] We would like to get to a 
commodity level where we could just interchange things without any worry, but that’s not exactly 
where we are yet […] If I know that it has been tested, it always works (Lead Engineer, emphasis 
added). 
In acknowledging these drawbacks our Engineer demonstrated an awareness of the potential 
limitations of the mainstream Modularity paradigm being performed. However, even in his 
sophisticated vision, he too saw their current situation as a temporary, intermediate step in the path 
towards full modularity, or the day where they would be able to simply swap, without worrying about 
fixing (system testing). In the meantime, system-level testing provided the means to detect faulty 
modules which could then be swapped out in exchange for a new module. In other words they were 
“fixing” (performing system-level testing which in principle should be redundant in fully modularised 
systems), despite their enduring belief in the power of swapping, and a swapping-kind of error was 
generated: boards could not be exchanged unproblematically. 
Outcome of the investigation: Vicious Cycle of Failures 
The investigation conducted on the Rework and Repair cycle thus produced an unexpected outcome: 
defective boards continued circulating without getting fixed (Figure 1b).  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1b about here 
---------------------------------- 
Once a (still defective) board arrived at the integrator re-labelled as a new board, shop floor 
practitioners were unable to recall that the board had previously failed. Because the new identity 
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provided a clean slate, the board was not put through Failure Analysis (where repaired boards should 
have undergone system level testing for verification), but was instead put once again through 
production as a new board. Here, the still defective board would almost certainly produce a new fail. 
Because the board remained the component most likely to have caused the failure, this was once again 
chosen as candidate for replacement and sent back to the supplier for repair. There it was not repaired, 
as the supplier did not have system testing capabilities. System level faults did not show up in the 
supplier’s tests and consequently did not get fixed. The board was re-serialised and returned 
unrepaired to the integrator only to fail again.  
 
These dynamics resulted in a vicious failure cycle of undetected faults and potentially repeated 
failures: test techs at the integrator did not know what they were swapping, the supplier did not know 
what they were fixing, the integrator did not know whether the board that arrived from the supplier 
was new, or, if it was a repaired board, whether it had been actually fixed. A defective loop was 
generated, whereby boards kept coming back and forth between the integrator and component 
supplier but remained unrepaired. In the previous context where debugging was performed in-house, 
this problem had been prevented by an easy and quick route from the production line to the nearby FA 
area where the board would get repaired and re-tested (Figure 1a, Stage 1). The investigation 
concluded that an element of unpredictability and a source of error had been created as a consequence 
of bug-fixing having become decoupled across the integrator/supplier boundary.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1a about here 
----------------------------------- 
Stage 3 – Modularity persists but modified 
As highlighted by the investigation, modularity theory, and its key rules and assumptions, were being 
performed fiercely in almost every aspect of the rework cycle where modularity rules had been able to 
prevail practically unchallenged. The errors brought up by the investigation, however, were about to 
produce some dramatic changes. The evidence of potential reliability and quality losses was promptly 
enrolled by those supporting reliability, which thus began to gain traction. From a reliability 
viewpoint, it was becoming increasingly clear that modularity and complementary rules had made the 
organization so efficient that it had become too lean to learn, both from its own and the supplier’s 
errors.   
 
A new network, supporting the reliability argument, began to emerge. New statistics began to surface 
that challenged practitioners to reflect on the consequences of undetected failures in production and in 
the field. Failure information that had once been ignored began to be foregrounded. People in 
corridors debated the pros and cons of letting errors proliferate uncorrected. Meetings were called 
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which provided opportunities to discuss the possible implications of bringing Rework back in-house. 
At the same time, arguments were being advanced from the modularity side of the debate warning that 
re-internalizing rework would imply incurring the costs and responsibility of repairing boards which 
they themselves had not broken, costs which would have normally been incurred by the supplier. 
These drawbacks however appeared insignificant compared to the potential loss of reputation brought 
about by fixing errors creating outages in the field. Once it had been incorporated in a network that 
was rapidly growing in power and recognition, the evidence produced by the investigation could not 
be easily dismissed.  
 
Eventually, during the course of several meetings and heated debates, during which the supporters of 
the modularity and the reliability paradigms confronted one another, a temporary solution was 
eventually reached. This took the form of a compromise among different views and errors and 
resulted in re-internalising a limited portion of the rework, pertaining to some of the most common 
failure causes for that particular board type (Figure 1a, Stage 3). This solution, which reflected a 
partial victory for reliability, was supported despite implications for cost (the need to take 
responsibility for boards damaged on the premises), skills (the requirement to retrain technicians to 
undertake rework), technical implications (the need to re-acquire tools necessary to perform repair in-
house), and despite the fact that this component was classified as critical, but ultimately non-core.  
 
Yet, the solution did not imply that they were ready to simply abandon modularity. While reliability 
posed a strong challenge, modularity rules had been successfully entangled with practically every 
aspect of the rework cycle. They were embedded and enacted in the design of the product and the 
interfaces, in the software tools and methodologies used to manage inventories, in key aspects of the 
relationship between integrator and supplier, in the distribution of repair competences and skills, in 
the philosophy that avoided trust and relinquished control, and finally in both formal and informal 
shop-floor procedures. All these aspects added to the strength of modularity rules and meant that they 
were hard to overturn. For example, artefacts like the Oracle database, which was the material 
embodiment of the “swapping” imperative, were difficult to work around. Even those practitioners 
who had hinted at possible limitations in performing the ideal modular organisation, including the 
Engineer who circulated the (unintentionally) incendiary email that set off the investigation, 
interpreted this just as a temporary setback in the path towards full modularity. 
 
 The decision to bring some of the rework back in-house, therefore, must be seen in the light of the 
predominance of modularity and its rules. The compromise solution did not in fact invalidate the 
theory. Rather, this temporary and partial remedy allowed modularity to continue to be performed 
(embodied, embedded and enacted) in almost every aspect of the rework routine, although in a 
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slightly modified, less perfectly decoupled form. Despite these problems, the practitioners’ belief in 
the power of modularity remained very much alive. 
 
Discussion 
Drawing on our rich data set, we can now proceed to introduce our theoretical framework which will 
unravel the dynamics through which modularity was performed within and beyond the context of the 
rework process (Fig. 2). This in turn will shed light over the competition between modularity and 
contrasting theories, and their implications for the mutual shaping of theory and organization. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Our in-depth, longitudinal case study highlighted the coexistence of two main theories attempting to 
configure the rework process and the wider organization: modularity and reliability. The dominant 
theory consisted of modularity and a complementary set of efficiency-bearing rules and tools (Zero 
Inventory and Autoswap). The challenging theory included reliability rules and a complementary set 
of principles (quality). We find that the competition between modularity and reliability in the rework 
context involved three phases: initially, modularity prevailed (rework was outsourced to the supplier); 
then reliability gained strength and clashed with modularity (triggering the investigation); and, finally, 
a compromise was reached between the two theories and associated sets of rules (following which 
rework was brought back in-house). 
 
Modularity framing the Rework process (and ensuing errors) 
As illustrated by the company history, modularity had been reigning almost unchallenged within the 
rework process and the wider organization. The performation of modularity depended upon the 
realization of a specific set of rules, or ‘conditions of felicity’ (Austin 1962, Callon 2007) which, for 
modularity to have an effect, had to frame the rework process. Modularity rules included product 
design rules, which are “[…] principles that define how an artifact works, what it does and how it is 
manufactured” (Brusoni and Prencipe 2006: 179) as well as the related organizational principles and 
properties that are required for the rules to be performed. More specifically, modularity rules 
included: the modularization of product and organizational architectures, the codification and 
standardization of product and organizational interfaces, maintaining an arm’s length relationship 
with suppliers, and performing a clear division of knowledge, problem-solving and productive labour, 
responsibility and accountability across the supplier/producer boundary (see Table 1).  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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A complementary set of efficiency-bearing rules contributed towards supporting modularity, 
including the principles of ‘Lean’ or ‘Zero Inventory’, and ‘Autoswap’, regulating the automatic 
exchange of boards with the supplier. Throughout most of the company history up until the beginning 
of the observation period (first stage), this complex set of rules appeared to be firmly in place and was 
effectively framing the process. Over time, however, another competing theory, reliability, had begun 
to gain momentum.  
 
In the second stage, modularity began to clash with reliability in the rework process. The reliability 
focus, a consequence of the acquisition of the high-end server product line, had been coexisting for a 
while alongside modularity and its complementary efficiency-bearing strategies. Following the 
economic crisis, however, the increasing pressure towards modularity and leanness at both product 
and organizational levels had led to the outsourcing of rework. Frictions had begun to emerge 
between modularity and reliability, which culminated with an email being circulated, which exposed 
important potential instances of reliability loss. Reliability rules required that faults should be detected 
and traced, errors remedied and failures prevented; boards and all components tracked throughout 
their life-cycle and system level diagnostics performed at the supplier’s premises; knowledge and 
problem-solving integrated and responsibility and accountability shared with the supplier. A set of 
quality principles complemented the reliability statement, setting the parameters within which the 
boards needed to operate to guarantee acceptable failure rates (see Table 1).  
 
Beyond rules, our data shows the emergence of another category of elements: ‘errors’ (Fig.2). Similar 
to Callon’s ‘overflowing’ (1998), errors followed from the competition between (temporarily) 
conflicting theories, modularity and reliability, as a consequence of their joint attempts to frame the 
rework process. Thus, in the first stage, those actors supporting reliability had exposed how 
performing modularity was generating errors of the “fixing” kind (boards circulating and not getting 
fixed). In the second stage, modularity supporters had instead highlighted the possibility that 
performing reliability might produce “swapping” errors (the integrator would pay for fixing boards 
that it had not broken). Errors were therefore enrolled in the confrontations between modularity and 
reliability and helped shape the discussion.  
 
Practitioners soon found themselves negotiating between different theories (modularity or reliability) 
and their (actual or potential) errors. For example, fixing errors were promptly enrolled as evidence of 
the drawbacks of modularity by actors supporting reliability and were used to strengthen their claims 
against the prevailing theory. Negotiations led to a compromise in the third stage, where modularity 
prevailed but was modified. Reliability, nevertheless, had at least partially succeeded in highlighting 
and problematizing the errors created by modularity, to the extent that practitioners decided to take 
action. The decision to change the organizational boundaries to re-insource aspects of rework 
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represented a partial victory for reliability (partial because the fix ultimately meant that modularity 
continued to dominate in all other aspects of the rework process). 
 
Performative struggles and materiality 
An important related point is that modularity and reliability rules (and their errors) were able to frame 
and reframe the rework process by involving a heterogeneous set of material elements (Callon and 
Caliskan 2010). Modularity rules, for example, which supported “swapping” (switching and returning 
a faulty board to the supplier), were embedded in different aspects of the rework process, including 
tools and technologies (such as the Autoswap system and the Oracle database which together turned 
the swapping of faulty modules into the default option); were enacted through the participants 
physical bodies and ostensive understandings of the rework process and its purpose; and they were 
enacted through formal routines and informal heuristics (as in the methodology used by shop floor 
technicians for diagnosing failed boards). Reliability rules, instead, which supported “fixing” 
(switching and repairing a failed board in-house), did not succeed in enrolling RFID which would 
have supported the automatic tracking and tracing of boards across the supplier/integrator boundary 
and along rework cycle. The extent to which practitioners were able to mobilize social and material 
features in support of one theory over another helps explain how a theory might begin to dominate in 
an organization and the consequences for its structure and boundaries. 
 
The battle between contrasting theories can therefore be understood as the confrontation between 
multiple competing ordering systems (the theories, their rules and the array of sociomaterial elements 
that support them). Sometimes these ordering systems underpinning a theory, corresponding to 
different ‘logics’ (Purdy and Gray 2009; Greenwood et al. 2011), including interpretations, meanings 
or understandings of the process (Dougherty 1992; Bechky 2003; Carlile 2004) plus the sociomaterial 
infrastructures that support them (or ‘logistics’), may overlap substantially (Berg and Timmermans 
2000). Yet at other times, as our case illustrates, they may be opposing each other in an almost 
dialectical manner. The outcome in any case is likely to be an “amalgam of logics” (ibid: 43) as 
exemplified by the compromise between a “swapping” and a “fixing” logic eventually reached in the 
rework area.  
 
What did this compromise look like and how did it configure the rework process? While modularity, 
by embedding itself in most aspects of the rework process, had won the war and retained its dominant 
position in the rework process, it was clear that reliability had managed to secure at least one crucial 
victory. The hidden ‘fixing errors’ that had been highlighted by the performative struggle against 
reliability, embedded in the material form of failure stats and charts used as the basis for negotiations, 
had been acknowledged and addressed by bringing the Rework back in-house. This brought renewed 
(albeit temporary) stability to the process, as reflected in a renewed balance of power between the two 
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competing theories. Modularity’s main rationale, “swapping”, was therefore able to continue to thrive, 
not despite, but because it could draw upon its errors (“fixing”). 
 
Organization modifies the theory 
Performative struggles therefore resulted in changes to the organization which became more closely-
coupled than the modularity ideal of perfect integrator - which our practitioners were pursuing - 
would have allowed. The outcome of the competition between two theories in the context of the 
rework process however also implied that modularity itself was modified as a result of the 
performative struggle against reliability. This particular instance of performation of the theory had 
challenged - and at least marginally deflated - the company’s unwavering faith in the power of 
modularity. Or, perhaps more precisely, it had suggested that a more sophisticated dynamic balance 
was required at this point in time, in this particular organization, between efficiency- and reliability-
bearing strategies, two important (usually complementary, but in this particular case temporarily 
conflicting) sides of the lean production philosophy (Womack and Jones 1996). As a consequence, 
modularity was therefore still being performed, albeit to a lesser extent. The performative struggles 
between modularity and reliability over time and in the context of this organization had eventually 
resulted in the modification of the theory itself.   
Conclusions 
In this paper we have considered the effect of organizational theories on the organization by focusing 
on how modularity, a widespread and influential organizational theory, was able to shape the 
organization, and how it was shaped in return. We have done so by focusing on how modularity and 
associated rules were performed, over time and in the context of a contemporary pioneering high-
technology organization, whose history and successes have been closely tied to those of modularity 
itself. Through a high level of field access which has allowed us to follow the changes occurring to 
the rework process in detail and over time, we were able to gain valuable new insights into the co-
production of theory and organization.  
 
Drawing on the performativity thesis this paper thus contributes to studies of modularity through a 
theoretical framework which captures how modularity is performed in context and over time. Our 
framework helps us theorize how the modular organization emerges as the outcome of performative 
struggles among competing theories (modularity and reliability) and their rules, and how these 
sociomaterial struggles and the ensuing errors modify the theory and shape the structure and 
boundaries of the organization. In so doing, we also add to performativity-inspired approaches in 
Economic Sociology, the Sociology of Finance and Organizational Theory, which have thus far 
mainly focused on the influence of individual theories, by theorising the competitions between 
multiple theories, their outcomes, and the implications for organizational practices and boundaries. 
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We conclude by highlighting three core findings that provide the basis for a performative study of 
modularity and wider organizational theories. 
Theories (and their errors) perform organizations 
The first key contribution resulting from studying modularity from a performative perspective is a 
theoretical framework which captures the more complex, dynamic and nuanced effects of modularity 
rules on the organization. As our evidence shows, while modularity rules can indeed be fully 
prescriptive or merely descriptive, they are often performed by actors to different levels and with 
varying outcomes. We therefore add to those contributions in the modularity literature which have 
offered opposing arguments for modularity theory – i.e. that it either succeeds or fails to ‘design’ 
(Brusoni and Prencipe 2001) modular organizations – by showing how and how far the theory is 
enacted and shapes the organization, and how it may be shaped in return. In our case, the evidence 
shows that Modularity was being performed successfully in most aspects of the rework process. We 
can therefore place the outcome of performing Modularity, in the rework context and during the 
period of observation, at the ‘strong’ end of the performativity range (MacKenzie 2006).  
 
At the same time, however, our evidence also shows that the ‘translation’ (Callon 1986) of modularity 
rules into a modular organization was incomplete. In framing the rework process, modularity rules 
had created errors which were promptly enrolled by the competing paradigm, reliability, and used to 
modify both the theory and the organization. The re-internalization of a portion of rework, in response 
to fixing errors, had thus allowed modularity to prevail, albeit in a modified form, marginally closer to 
the integral than the fully decoupled end of the spectrum. ‘Errors’ (or, in performativity terms, the 
overflowing) have been a neglected aspect of modularity studies having been implicitly viewed as 
either the outcome of the theory not being fully or correctly implemented into technological and/or 
organizational interfaces (mainstream approach); or as the result of the failure of the theory itself to 
account for organizational and technological complexity (contingency approach). Through our 
performative lens, instead, we were able to theorize the emergence of errors not simply as a failure of 
technology/organization to reproduce the theory or a failure of the theory to reflect the complexity of 
technology/organization but as the continuously emergent outcome of performative struggles among 
competing theories in their context. The emphasis on context has also provided important insights into 
the organization’s ability (or lack thereof) to harness overflows and use them to reconfigure its 
boundaries and/or the theory.  
 
In further theorizing the role of errors, our findings also add to performativity-inspired approaches in 
Organizational Theory (Cabantous and Gond 2011), and the discussion of ‘overflows’ in 
Performativity Theory (Callon 1998). In the first case, our results add to the extant theory by showing 
precisely how overflows may (or may not) contribute to constituting and modifying organizations and 
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their theories. In the second case, we shed new light over the possible sources of overflows. Whereas 
the extant theory (ibid) has focused on the emergence of overflows as resulting from ‘imperfections’ 
within the frame, we demonstrate that overflows may be at least partially constituted outside the 
frame, from a theory’s interactions with other theories operating within and beyond the organizational 
context.   
Performative struggles shape organizational boundaries 
Our second core contribution therefore consists in theorizing the coexistence of modularity with 
competing theories, their performative struggles and their implications for the organization and the 
theory. Our in-depth, longitudinal study set in a contemporary high-technology organization exposed 
to multiple organizational and institutional pressures showed how modularity did not operate alone 
but instead coexisted together with other theories which were also attempting to configure the 
organization at the same time. As our evidence illustrates, within organizations and beyond, theories 
rarely exist in isolation.  Rather, organizations are typically configured by multiple ordering systems, 
including a plurality of theories, each with their own rules and assumptions. Some theories may be 
mostly complementary (as, in our case, modularity and zero inventory principles, or reliability and 
quality), whereas others may be largely in conflict (as the efficiency-bearing modularity rules and 
reliability). To complicate the picture, alliances among theories may shift quite significantly both over 
time and in the context where they are enacted.  
 
The presence of competing theories, and their influence over organizational structure and boundaries, 
has been largely neglected within studies of modularity. Building on the case of a diverse and 
distributed organization, and drawing on performativity’s emphasis on plurality and multiplicity, we 
were able to add to extant contributions by revealing how different sets of rules do not always merely 
substitute one another, but often become involved in dynamic confrontations. While confrontations 
can indeed result in the replacement of one rule, which becomes non-performative, for another, which 
becomes performative (as in Brusoni and Prencipe 2006), often their outcomes tend to reflect a 
synthesis, involving mutual dynamic adaptation under conditions of uncertainty. Our results therefore 
add to the modularity debate by theorizing the dynamics underpinning performative struggles (Callon 
2007) and how they shape both theory and organization. In addition, as theories evolve through 
competing, their influence varies over time and across organizations, so that any outcomes can only 
ever be emergent. It is therefore the dynamic competitions among contrasting theories, and not simply 
rules (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996) or knowledge (Brusoni et al. 2001) as the current debate would 
have it, which ultimately modify theories and ‘design organizations’. While adding to modularity, this 
finding also responds to the recent call for studying how different “[…] theories interact and influence 
organizational practices” and shape organizational behaviours and outcomes “[…] through 
performativity struggles” (Cabantous and Gond 2011: 582). While Callon (2007) has suggested “[…] 
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to re-imagine organizations and markets as sites for "performativity struggles" this perspective has yet 
to be explored” (Cabantous et al. 2014). But what are the micro-level dynamics which define how 
theories compete? 
 
A related finding is that, to exert its influence, modularity had to build a scaffold, including an array 
of social and material features (similar to Callon’s agencement) which supported the realization of its 
rules in practice. Modularity and complementary efficiency rules, for example, were so thoroughly 
embedded in texts, technologies and artifacts that there were serious limitations on how far actors 
could operate ‘outside’ the theory. A neglected aspect of current theorizing, capturing the 
sociomaterial aspect of rules performation, or “[…] how [a] theory is translated into tools and material 
devices” (Cabantous and Gond 2011: 583) thus further adds to current explanations for the success of 
modularity beyond abstract rules and knowledge. A performative framework therefore allows us to 
capture how the structure and boundaries of the modular organization are continuously challenged and 
constantly shift to reflect the particular array of (infra- and inter-organizational, social and material) 
relationships that produces them at any one time and over time. In so doing, our findings also add to 
performativity-inspired approaches to Organizational Theory (ibid) by capturing how multiple 
sociomaterial networks may confront one another in their effort to support competing theories, often 
influencing the organizational outcomes. Sociomateriality can therefore help us understand how a 
theory may be able to contribute to ‘designing’ an organization. Our evidence, however also suggest 
that the organization itself might in return participate in ‘designing’ the theory. 
The mutual production of theory and organization 
Our final key finding concerns the mutual shaping of theory and organization. Our case study has 
highlighted the subtle ways in which modularity rules might be able to (re)configure the organization, 
its structure, processes and boundaries, while also shedding light over how, in turn, the situated 
enactment of modularity in this particular organization ended up modifying the theory. In the first 
case, concerning the influence of theory over organization, we have seen how the company’s vision of 
modularity as an efficiency-seeking strategy aimed at standardizing and distributing products and 
organization and therefore supporting superior leanness and cost reduction, conflicted substantially 
with reliability, which instead demanded redundancy and substantial overlap of production knowledge 
and activities.  
 
In the second case, concerning the influence of the organization over theory, we have instead seen 
that, while modularity did manage to frame the rework process, at the same time it prompted the 
emergence of errors. These were readily enrolled by the competing rationale, reliability, which was 
able to win a marginal victory in the performative struggles between the two theories. This indicates 
that performing modularity had produced an extraordinarily lean and efficient organization, which 
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was however brittle and fragile, and therefore prone to failure. The threat of failure, as highlighted and 
problematized by the supporters of the reliability argument, was considered to be such that induced 
practitioners to revise their vision of modularity. As a consequence of the confrontation with 
reliability, modularity was modified. In capturing and theorizing the mutual shaping of theory and 
organization, this finding adds to both studies of modularity (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996; Brusoni et al. 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe 2006) and wider approaches on the 
performativity of (organizational) theories (Cabantous et al. 2010; Cabantous and Gond 2011).  
 
Our findings beg a further and final question. Will the lessons from this outstanding organization, 
which had such a deep historical relationship with modularity, also succeed in modifying the wider 
theory, namely the scholarly debate surrounding modularity? While we are unable to predict any 
specific outcomes at this stage, we believe that it will depend upon the willingness of both the 
mainstream and the contingency sides of the modularity debate to engage with our results and novel 
approach which at the same time both reconciles and adds to the existing sides of the debate. It would 
be interesting, for example, if this outstanding organization which has initially sparked the academic 
interest towards modularity, would end up once again teaching us scholars some important theoretical 
lessons about the mutual shaping of theories and organizations.  
 
Pushing our insights even further, we can foresee promising grounds for future investigation that may 
emerge from our novel approach. We envisage a new stream of studies investigating how the 
struggles among different (contradictory and complementary) theories, and their associated rules, 
rationales and logics, may play out and transform different organizational contexts. This would add to 
extant approaches which have focused on different rationales or logics within the same theory (as in 
Cabantous and Gond’s 2011 example of rational choice theory). Further advances that build on our 
framework might also include shedding new light over the emergence of macro theories and their 
organizational effects. Among the interesting features highlighted by our case evidence and related 
discussion, for example, is the interesting hypothesis that the confrontation between modularity and 
reliability followed the unexpected emergence of tensions between two different (but usually 
complementary) sides of Lean Production theory, the ‘efficiency’, or ‘cost reduction’ side and the 
‘zero defects’ side. Taking this insight further would prompt a timely investigation into the emergence 
of Lean Production as a meta-theory, incorporating both efficiency and reliability principles, albeit in 
different proportions. The question to arise then would be whether it was the imbalance created in our 
case by the overemphasis on the efficiency side of lean that brought two usually complementary 
features to clash irremediably. One possible answer, we posit, is that incorporating the errors and re-
internalizing rework had the effect of temporarily restoring a balance between the two sides of this 
influential management theory, a balance which had been lost following the increasing emphasis on 
efficiency brought about by the electronics sector crisis.  
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While a comprehensive analysis of this topic lies beyond the scope of this paper, results indicate that 
our analytical framework based on performativity can contribute more generally towards advancing 
our understanding of fundamental aspects of contemporary organizing. In capturing the mutual 
constitution of multiple theories and organization, our approach begins to help unravel how 
organizations are able to manage apparently unsolvable conflicts and contradictions (Adler et al. 
1999, Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004) and dynamically adapt to change. Especially in tough and fast 
changing competitive environments, this crucial ability lies at the very basis of an organization’s 
potential to survive and prosper. 
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Figure 1 - Computer board rework and repair cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Theoretical Framework 
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Figure 1b Rework outsourced [Stage 2] 
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Table 1 Modularity and Reliability Rules (framing) and their Errors (overflowing) 
 
  
‘Fixing’ (performing reliability) vs. ‘Swapping’ (performing modularity) 
 
RESERIALISING/ 
LOSS OF IDENTITY  
Rule Swapping. No need for coordination. Modular systems ‘hide information’ 
behind standardized interfaces so that the component’s internal characteristics 
can be overlooked (Parnas et al. 1985; Baldwin & Clark, 2001; Sanchez & 
Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000; Sturgeon 2002; Langlois 2002). 
Error Fixing. Loss of memory, failure history, loss of traceability, no learning 
(Fixing => emphasis on “continuous learning”) (Weick et al. 1999) 
ZERO INVENTORY/ 
AUTOSWAP 
Rule Swapping. Full component interchangeability, ‘mix and match’. Clear 
standardization and decoupling of components within a system means that 
these can be swapped and substituted straightforwardly (Sanchez & Mahoney 
1996)  
 
No slack, ‘zero inventory’ (Womack & Jones 1996) 
Error Fixing. No redundancy, combined with swapping means no tracking and 
tracing (Fixing => acknowledging key role of slack, redundancy) (Weick et al. 
1999) 
PROBLEM 
OWNERSHIP/ 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Rule Swapping. No need to take ownership of/responsibility for failure “shifting the 
problem” 
Error Fixing. Losing track of failures, shifting the problem (Fixing=> “owning the 
problem”, emphasis on “heed” “attention” and “care”) (Roberts 1990;  Weick 
& Roberts 1993) 
SHARP DIV OF LAB/ 
ASYMMETRIC VIEWS/ 
UNEVEN ACCESS TO 
TOOLS 
Rule Swapping. Sharp division of productive labor (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996).  
Outsourcing allows systems integrator to relinquish ownership and 
responsibility for subcontracted components. Separation of component from 
system testing 
Error Fixing. Unable to fault find (Fixing => coordination through “shared 
ideology” or “mindsets”, “collective mindfulness”) (Weick at el. 1999; 
Vaughan 1996) 
ARM’S LENGTH 
RELATIONSHIP 
Rule Swapping. Market-like, arm’s length relationship with suppliers (Langlois 
2002) 
Error Fixing. Not being able to know if it has been fixed (Fixing =>  emphasis on 
coordination, collaboration, trust, “collegiality”) (Rousseau et al. 1998, 
LaPorte & Consolini 1993), preoccupation with failure (Weick & Sutcliffe 
2001) 
JUDGEMENT & 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
Rule Swapping. Elimination of uncertainty, ambiguity, judgement in problem-
solving. A modular organization is “[…] one in which tasks and 
responsibilities are distributed across separate groups/units, which do not 
engage in ongoing, real-time communication and joint problem solving” 
(Carliss Baldwin, personal communication). In fully modular systems, 
interactions among components and overall system behaviour entirely 
predictable, process of assembling components into a functioning system 
reduced to simple Lego-like activity. 
Error Fixing. Fragmented problem-solving (Fixing=> joint problem solving by 
teams of experts, reluctance to simplify interpretations, Weick & Sutcliffe 
2001) 
FORMAL & 
INFORMAL RULES, 
PROCEDURES 
Rule Swapping. Clear division of knowledge and capabilities across the 
integrator/supplier boundaries (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996; Ulrich & Eppinger 
1995). Loosely-coupled modular system (Orton & Weick 1990) no need to 
fault-find (exploitation). Formal and informal procedures support automatic 
switching and shifting responsibility to suppliers 
Error Fixing. Unable to know for certain the cause of failure (Fixing => “zero 
tolerance” on errors, Failure is Not An Option) (exploration) 
SYSTEMIC 
INTERACTIONS 
Rule Fixing. Need for understanding systemic interdependencies, need for systems 
integration (Brusoni et al. 2001; Hobday et al. 2005)  
 
Rapid, uneven innovation (Nelson & Winter 1982) destabilizes server system 
Error Swapping. Unable to unproblematically switch boards in a system (Swapping 
=> no need to test system (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996) 
 
